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NOTE
The Basic Institutional Structure of LAFTA
and the Proposals for its Modification:
Inter-governmentalism vs. Regionalism
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LATIN AMERICAN Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was
established by the Treaty of Montevideo, signed on February
18, 1960, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay.' Article 58 provides for the accession of other Latin
American States. Bolivia, even though an original participant in
the drafting of the Treaty, did not finally accede until 1967, in
spite of special dispensations extended to her by Protocol No. 5.
Ecuador and Colombia acceded in 1961, followed by Venezuela in
1966.
The signatory States express their determination in the Pream-
ble: "to persevere in their efforts to establish, gradually and pro-
gressively, a Latin American common market and, hence, to con-
tinue collaborating with the Latin American Governments as a
whole in the work already initiated for this purpose...." In addi-
tion, the Preamble states that the signatories are: "Motivated by
the desire to pool their efforts to achieve gradually complementary
and integrated national economies on the basis of an effective re-
ciprocity of benefits ...... Within the body of the Treaty, Article
54 refers again to the goal of a common market:
The contracting Parties shall make every effort to direct their
policies with a view to creating conditions favorable to the estab-
lishment of a Latin American common market. To that end, the
Committee shall undertake studies and consider projects and plans
designed to achieve this purpose, and shall endeavor to coordinate
its work with that of other international organizations.
1 The Treaty went into effect on May 2, 1961, the date when the signatories de-
posited their respective instruments of ratification with the government of Uruguay.
Two originals of the Treaty were signed, one in Spanish and one in Portuguese, both
texts being equally authentic. English versions of the Treaty appear in: MULTI-
LATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA, United Nations Doc. No.
E/CN.12/621 (1962), 57-69; INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF
LATIN AMERICA 207-29 (1968) [hereinafter IJILS INSTRUMENTS]; S. DELL, A LATIN
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET? 228-56 (1966); [hereinafter all references to the
Treaty are by article number only).
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF LAFTA
Article 54, as well as the abundant references to integration and
complementarity contained in Chapter III of the Treaty, together
seem to indicate that the character of the Association was thought of
as something beyond a free trade area, and yet below the level of
a common market.2
On the other hand, some authorities believe that the institutions
created by the Montevideo instrument were never intended to pro-
vide -a central decision-making authority on problems of economic
integration.' Under this view, the LAFTA institutions were created
merely to supervise the main function of the Association, i.e., the
reduction of intra-regional tariffs and other barriers to trade.4
Within twelve years after the Treaty enters into force the contract-
ing Parties "[S]hall gradually eliminate, in respect of substantially
all their reciprocal trade, such duties, charges, and restrictions as
may be applied to imports of goods originating in the territory of
any contracting Party."' The reductions and eventual elimination
of trade barriers are to be accomplished by means of negotiations,
resulting in the drawing up of (1) National Schedules, in which
each Party specifies the annual reductions granted to the other
Parties and (2) a Common Schedule which lists all the products in
respect of which the Parties have agreed, collectively, to eliminate
all restrictions. 6
The reduction of restrictions is to be carried out in accordance
with a time-table, as set forth in Article 7, viz: 25%o in the first 3
years, 50o at the end of 6 years, 75o at the end of 9 years, and
"substantially all of such trade during the fourth 3-year period."
Methods for calculating the required percentages, and the proce-
dures to be followed in the negotiations are provided for in Proto-
col No. 1, signed at the same time as, and made a part of the Treaty.7
Thus, the above examination of the trade liberalization provisions
of Chapter II, as well as the statement of purpose in Article 1 seem
to indicate that perhaps the Association in fact was never intended
2 M. Wionczek, A History of the Montevideo Treaty, in LATIN AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC INTEGRATION 72 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966).
3 S. DELL, supra note 1, at 197.
4 Id.
5 Arts. 2, 3.
6 Art. 4.
7 Arts. 5, 7; Protocol No. 1; Resolution 5(I). Resolution No. 5 sets forth the kinds
of instruments which establish and regulate the institutional structure, both substantive
and procedural, of the Association. Protocols are important sources of institutional
law, and have been used to amend or modify the Treaty.
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to have general competency to act in the area of over all economic
integration.'
However, the language of the Preamble, and Article 54, as well
as the statement in Article 61 that after the initial twelve-year pe-
riod has passed the Parties are to study the results and thereafter:
"shall initiate the necessary collective negotiations with a view to
fulfilling more effectively the purposes of the Treaty and, if desir-
able, to adapting it to a new stage of economic integration .... '
(emphasis added), all tend to indicate that something grander than
a mere free trade area was contemplated.
Analysis solely of the institutional framework of the Association,
however, reveals that it was conceived only as a function of the im-
mediate objectives of the Association, or in other words, the reduc-
tion of trade barriers within the area of the signatory states.10 A
number of reasons have been advanced for the failure of the Treaty
signatories to create a stronger institutional framework for LAFTA.
It has been said, for instance, that:
[Tjraditionally, the Latin American Countries have had much
closer relations with North American and Western Europe than
with one another. One should not underestimate the barrier to re-
gional co-operation that results quite simply from lack of famil-
iarity of the Latin American peoples with one another. 1
Consequently, the weakness of intra-regional trade makes it diffi-
cult for Latin American nations to consider shifting their policies
from a third-country orientation to that of a predominantly regional
one.
12
It has also been theorized that the Treaty was the best of pos-
sible political compromises among the varied positions of the nego-
tiating governments, and that the lack of any discernible support
from without was another factor contributing to the weakness of
the instrument.'"  The institutional framework of LAFTA as es-
8Article 1 states: "By this Treaty the contracting Parties establish a Free Trade
Area and institute the Latin American Free Trade Association . . .with headquarters
in the city of Montevideo (Eastern Republic of Uruguay)."
9 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, DERECHO
DE LA INTEGRAcION LATINOAMERICANA 713 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DERECHO
DR INTEGRACION].
10 S. DELL, supra note 1, at 197-98.
11 G. Magarifios, Integration Instruments and LAFTA Achievements, in LATIN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 125 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966).
12Id.
13 Wionczek, The Latin American Free Trade Asso'ciation, INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION No. 551, January, 1965, at 24. See N. BAILEY, LATIN AMERICA IN
WORLD POLITICS 173, n. 12, and related text (1967); F. Orrego-Vicufia, Developments
[Vol. 2: 34
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tablished in the Montevideo Treaty is easier to understand, however,
if one recognizes that there are a number of invisible political and
cultural barriers which separate the Latin American republics. 4
As originally established by the Montevideo Treaty, LAFTA
could perhaps best be characterized as an international organization
of an intergovernmental nature which acts in the field of trade reg-
ulation and economic integration.' 5 It is the product of the col-
lective "political will" of the signatory states. As such, the Treaty
sets forth the higher goals of integration to which the Association
eventually is to succeed, while exacting a minimum of binding com-
mitments. Clearly, however, these commitments are susceptible of
amplification and change in order to attain the higher goals to
which the Treaty alludes.' 6 Thus, not only the original instrument
itself, but also other documents and the actions taken pursuant to
them comprise the current institutional framework of LAFTA:
[T]he institutional system of LAFTA cannot be examined solely
in view of the Montevideo Treaty, which would give an incom-
plete picture, but also, and especially in the light of subsequent
developments which are tending toward a strengthening of the
institutional bases of the Association. 17
Indeed, the Treaty has been called " ... the beginning of a
process, not the end ... "18 It is with this in mind that we must
first consider the original institutional framework as established by
the Montevideo instrument.
in the Latin American Free Trade Association, 1967 PROCEEDINGS, AM. Soc. INT'L L.
174 [hereinafter cited as 1967 PROCEEDINGS]; Wionczek, supra note 2, at 93-8.
14 One Latin American scholar alluded to these barriers and their effect as follows:
"One sees the old Bolivarian aspiration of a united America beset by incomprehensible
prejudices, as it survives even now amid the antiquated schemes of absolute sover-
eignty... . T] he political decisions our case requires in order to reach the desired ob-
jective [a common market] are not being taken .... Our rulers have lacked the cour-
age to face up to reality." F.J. Fern~indez Montero, Paralelo Entre el Tratado de Roma,
el Tratado de Montevideo y las Proposiciones para la Creacidn del Mercado Comzin
Latinoamericano at i (1967) (mimeographed thesis in University of Michigan Law
School Library) [translated by this author). See 1967 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at
174; D. BEARRESEN, M. CARNOY & J. GRUNWALD, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PAT-
TERNS 40-41 (1965).
15 DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 1029-30.
16 Id. at 422-3, 1029-30. Article 60 governs the procedure for amendment, which,
although mechanically a relatively simple process, nevertheless requires ratification
of the amending protocols by all of the contracting Parties individually, and the pro-
tocols do not enter into force until after all the instruments of ratification have been de-
posited with the Secretariat of the Association.
17 Id. at 713. [translated by this author]. See 1967 PROCEEDINGS, supra note, 13,
at 174.
18 S. Dell, The Early Years of LAFTA's Experiences, in LATIN AMERICAN EcO-
NOMIC INTEGRATION 105 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966).
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II. THE ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK OF LAFTA
The original institutional structure of the Association is basi-
cally composed of two organs arranged in an heirarchical order -
the Conference of the Contracting Parties, and the Standing Exe-
cutive Committee.' 9 The Secretariat is a subsidiary organ attached
to the Executive Committee and fulfills the technical and admin-
istrative functions of the Association. 20
The Conference is the highest authority within the Association.
It acts primarily as a legislative body - it determines policies and
promulgates regulations "in matters requiring joint action on the
part of the contracting Parties. ' '2' Article 34 also specifies several
powers of the Conference, inter alia:
(a) To take the necessary steps to carry out the present Treaty and
to study the results of its implementation;
(b) To promote the negotiations provided for in Article 4 and to
assess the results thereof;(c) To approve the Committee's annual budget and to fix the con-
tributions of each contracting Party;
(d) To lay down its own rules of procedure and to approve the
Committee's rules of procedure;
(e) To elect a Chairman and two Vice Chairmen for each session;
(f) To appoint the Executive Secretary of the Committee; and
(g) To deal with other business of common interest.
Since this entire list of attributions is set off by the phrase inter
alia, it is clear that this is not an exhaustive list of what the Confer-
ence may do. On the other hand, in spite of the rather sweeping
language in paragraph (a), that section, read together with para-
graph (b), would seem to indicate that the "necessary steps to
carry out the present Treaty" in paragraph (a) refers more to the
promotion of Article 4 negotiations in paragraph (b), than it does
to the language in other parts of the Treaty concerning economic in-
tegration and the eventual creation of a common market. 22  In
other words, it appears inconsistent to say that the Conference is
charged with taking the steps necessary for the creation of a common
market on the one hand, followed immediately with a charge that
19 Chapter IX of the Treaty, containing Articles 33-45, establishes the institutional
structure of the Association, and defines the powers and duties of the various organs.
Proposals have since been made to change this structure by specific amendment of
Article 33-39, to be discussed infra.
20 Art. 41.
21 Art. 34.
22See F.J. FernAndez Montero, supra note 14, at 44-5; G. Ortiz Urzua, LA
ASOCIACIoN LATINOAMERICANA DE LIBRE COMIIRCIO Y EL TRATADO DE MONTE-
VIDEO 145 (1966).
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it supervise the negotiations for the reduction of trade. Moreover,
as stated in Article 35, the Conference is composed of "duly accred-
ited representatives of the contracting Parties." Thus, the mem-
bers of the Conference are really only trade negotiators representing
their governments and are competent to act only at the working
level. This has been described as one of the fundamental institu-
tional weaknesses of the original LAFTA framework.2"
One authority, however, sees in the broad grant of powers con-
tained in Article 34(a) an elasticity and potential dynamism which
presumably allows the Conference to make a wide range of politi-
cal decisions, though admittedly, "the utilizing of these dynamic as-
pects depends exclusively on the political will of the governments. ' -24
It should also be noted that under Article 35 each delegation
has only one vote, so even though there may be different opinions
present among the members of any one delegation, it must vote as
one in representing its respective country. This may mean that the
conference is deprived of an interplay of opinion and debate which
otherwise might allow it to rise above the representation of purely
inter-governmental interests to a level of decision-making more
clearly based on communal and technical values.
Another aspect of the composition of the Conference is that
its members all represent their governments as individual, sovereign
states, a factor which not only makes it difficult for the Conference
to act, but also imposes upon each delegation the burden of pro-
tecting the interests of its own country - a burden not likely to
generate a significant amount of political independence within the
Conference. Thus, under the structure of the Association as es-
tablished in the Treaty there are serious institutional restrictions
upon decision-making by the Conference - and therefore the As-
sociation - which for all intents and purposes prevent it from
acting effectively in the community interest.2 5
The voting rules of the Conference, as established in Articles 37
and 38, work a further limitation on the actions which it can take.
Article 37 requires a quorum of 2/3 of the contracting Parties be-
fore any "decisions" can be taken. Under Article 38, ". . . decisions
of the Conference shall be adopted when affirmative votes are cast
by at least two thirds (2/3) of the contracting Parties and provid-
23 S. DELL, supra note 1, at 197-8.
24 1967 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 175.
2 5 DERECHO DR INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 721-22.
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ing that no negative vote is cast," (emphasis added).6 In effect,
then, each of the contracting Parties has a veto power over all those
matters not falling within the three exceptions contained in sub-
paragraphs a, b, and c of Article 38 which deal with rather routine
procedural matters. Clearly, this provision providing for a veto is
one of the most important factors relegating the Conference to the
role of an inter-governmental body. It allows each of the contract-
ing Parties to protect its own interests, even at the expense of the
community interest.
It has been pointed out that by adhering to the rigid voting
rules of Article 38, the Conference has actually excluded itself
from making the kind of political decisions most necessary for the
good of the community, and which it is empowered to make under
the broad language of its mandate.27 This may not be so much a
problem of the procedural structure of the organ, however, as it is
a problem of interpretation of the Treaty in a "narrow spirit that
produces unnecessary limitations not wanted by the Treaty. Once
again the political will of the governments is all that is responsible
for this lack of dynamism. ' 28
Yet another limitation on the efficacy of the Conference as a
dynamic force is that under Article 36 it meets only once a year, or
whenever convoked by the Standing Executive Committee. Thus,
even as the supreme organ of the Association, it cannot be said to
have the day-to-day contact with community problems which would
allow it to deal forthrightly and confidently with these problems.
Indeed, a summary report of the business conducted at the 8th
ordinary session of the Conference, October 21 through December
16, 1968, indicates that most of the work of the Conference was
26 Article 38 by its terms was to continue in effect only during the first 2 years after
the Treaty came into force, at which time the Parties were to determine what system
would be followed subsequently. Resolution 68(111), passed at the third regular session
of the Conference, in effect continued the same rules requiring a 2/3 vote and no nega-
tive votes. The resolution also recommends the gradual phasing out of the "no nega-
tive vote" requirement. There are, however, two important differences in the system
as set forth in the resolution: 1) the Conference is permitted to make express exceptions
to the rule requiring a 2/3 vote, and possibly (depending on the construction of the res-
olution) even to the rule requiring no negative votes, and 2) the Parties are directed to
add to the list of matters which are specifically excepted from the no negative vote
rule, set forth in Article 38, subparagraphs a, b, and c. Resolution 68(111) appears
in IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 299. See W. Johnson, The Montevideo Treaty
for a Latin American Free Trade Area, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND
ORGANIZATION 322, n. 14 (W. Lafave & P. Hay ed. 1967).
27 1967 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 175.
2 8 1d. at 176.
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devoted to trade negotiations and procedural matters, rather than to
more purely political or broad policy-making matters.29
The permanent organ of the Association is the Standing Execu-
tive Committee [referred to hereinafter as the Committee]. 30 The
Committee, as its name implies, is the executive organ of the Associ-
ation, and is charged, generally, with: "supervising the implementa-
tion of the provisions of the present Treaty." 1  This incumbency
differs somewhat from that of the Conference, which under Article
34(a) is to "take the necessary steps to carry out the present Treaty."
Since one of the specific duties of the Committee under Article
39(d) is to "submit to the Conference such recommendations as it
deems appropriate for the effective implementation of the Treaty,"
it would seem that the Committee fulfills the functions of acting
primarily as the "eyes and ears" of the Conference on a day to day
basis, overseeing the operation of regulations promulgated by the
Conference, and carrying out the reduction of tariffs and other trade
barriers as agreed to in the negotiations among the contracting Par-
ties.
The relationship between Conference and Committee is clearly
one of superior-subordinate, with the Conference being the policy
making body. Thus, the Committee is rather limited in what it can
do other than to fulfill its specified functions vis-a-vis the Confer-
ence. In many respects, the institutional weaknesses verified in
the structure of the Conference are present as well in the Committee,
and therefore neither organ can be said to represent "community"
values; both are purely inter-governmental in character.32
As one of the Committee's ennumerated list of "duties and re-
sponsibilities" under Article 39(g) it is: "To take such decisions as
may be delegated to it by the Conference .... " The question as to
whether the Committee might make decisions of policy has been
answered in the negative, based on the theory that any delegation of
authority from the Conference to the Committee would be qualified
impliedly by the general grant of competency to the Committee, i.e.,
its responsibility for "supervising the implementation of the provi-
sions of the present Treaty."33 (emphasis added) Moreover, it
must be remembered that of the powers specifically granted to the
29 ALALC, 5 SINTESIS MJENSUAL No. 43, January, 1969, at 2-20. [monthly bul-
letin published by the Association).
30 Art. 39.
31 Id.
32 Derecho de Integraci6n, supra note 9, at 728.
33 Id. at 719-20.
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Conference, there are included: (1) the power to approve the Com-
mittee's budget; (2) the power to approve the Committee's rules of
procedure; and (3) to appoint the Executive Secretary of the Com-
mittee .34
The Committee itself is composed of one permanent representa-
tive of each of the Parties, each with a single vote. 5 In order to
insure full representation of the Parties at all times, each representa-
tive has an alternate, and a delegation may have other members who
may be accredited by written notice from the principal representa-
tive. According to the Regulations of the Committee, the alternate
is to replace his principal in the event of "absence or impediment"
of the latter, and does so while assuming the same functions."6 It
is the Committee, then, which has the day-to-day contact with the
operation of the Association and thus with community problems.
Among the duties of the Committee, under Article 39, are: "d)
To undertake studies, to suggest measures and to submit to the Con-
ference such recommendations as it deems appropriate for the ef-
fective implementation of the Treaty; f) To request the technical
advice and the cooperation of individuals and of national and inter-
national organizations; h) To undertake the work assigned to it by
the Conference.""7 In fact, the Committee actually prepares a great
deal of the work to be considered by the Conference at its ordinary
sessions, including draft resolutions and protocols, results of studies,
and recommendations for action. The September, 1969 issue of
the Association's monthly publication, Sintesis Mensual, reveals a
wealth of studies undertaken by the Committee and actions which it
recommends to the Conference over a broad range of subjects deal-
ing with the strengthening of the institutional framework of LAFTA
and of the entire process of economic integration."8 Thus, even
34 Art. 34, subparagraphs c), d), and f), respectively.
35 Art. 40.
36 Art. 40; Regulations of the Standing Executive Committee Arts. 2, 3: Resolu-
tion 152 (VI) [a translation appears in IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 237-
45].
37 These duties are reiterated, essentially, in subparagraphs (j), (k), and (m), re-
spectively, of Article 6 of the Regulations of the Standing Executive Committee, supra
note 36. The regulations broaden these duties somewhat, however, in two additional
subparagraphs:
n) To attend to all other matters included within the objectives of the Treaty,
unless they have been specifically assigned to the Conference; and
o) To perform all other tasks and carry out the other functions entrusted to
it by the Treaty and related instruments. Id.
Thus, it appears that the Committee has a rather broad-ranging mandate to delve into
community problems and then make specific recommendations to the conference.
38ALALC, 5 SINTESIS MENSUAL, No. 51, Sepember, 1969.
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though it is composed of permanent representatives of the member
states, it seems clear that the Committee, because it deals with
problems on an executive day-to-day basis, comes closer to repre-
senting the values of the "community" than does the Conference.
However, since it has little or no power to make necessary political
decisions, the Committee's power is one of persuasion and influence
only, at least relative to the institutional strengthening of the Associ-
ation.
It is worth noting that the voting sysem in the Committee dif-
fers from that of the Conference, primarily in that there is no pro-
vision in the rules of the former for a veto. The regulations pro-
vide instead that votes of the Committee require only a 2/3 vote of
all the representatives, "unless it [the Committee] is acting in ac-
cordance with powers delegated by the Conference, in which case it
is required that there shall be no negative vote.'"'" The Committee
is enjoined, however, to "endeavor to see that its resolutions reflect
the consensus of opinions of all representatives. 40  It seems at
least possible that the Committee, when in the exercise of its own
business, could fashion a "community" solution to a problem, even
over the opposition of one or two of the representatives.
Much of the action of the Committee is actually taken as a result
of studies and projects carried out by the secretariat which is the ad-
ministrative and technical body within the Association. While the
secretariat is actually a part of the Committee and as such is respon-
sible directly to it, the Executive Secretary is elected by the Confer-
ence.4 The regulations of the Committee, however, provide that
"The Executive Secretary shall be responsible to the organs of the
Association for the proper conduct of business by the Secretariat. '4 2
Moreover, the Committee may, by a 2/3 vote, suspend the Executive
Secretary from his functions, but may only propose his removal to
the Conference "if he has committed serious acts or omissions which
affect the progress of the Association. '4 3  Thus, while nominally
the secretariat is the technical and administrative wing of the Com-
mittee, its director is appointed and removed independently from
the Committee itself. If it be true that the Executive Secretary im-
parts direction to the technical studies undertaken by the secretariat,
'49 Regulations of the Standing Executive Committee, supra note 36, Article 26.
401 d.
4 1 Art. 41.
42 Regulations of the Standing Executive Committee, supra note 36, Article 9.
44Id. Article 10.
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the fact that he is quite explicitly made responsible to the political
organ of the Association, i.e., the Conference, may mean that he
may not be as independent of political consequences as would be
desirable for a technical official to be, in order best to serve the in-
terests of the community. Under Article 42, however, the Executive
Secretary and his staff are enjoined from seeking or receiving in-
structions from any particular government or other national or inter-
national body. The contracting Parties, for their part, undertake
to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the
Secretary and his staff and are to refrain from attempting to influ-
ence them.44  Even in spite of this guarantee, and because of the
power in the Committee to suspend the Secretary and in the Con-
ference to remove him, it is unlikely that the secretariat as a whole
would feel itself independent enough to adopt the kind of new
and innovative positions in its studies which are necessary for the
growth and strengthening of the Association. On the other hand,
even if the secretariat and the Committee were to achieve a solid
working relationship and begin to formulate "community" solu-
tions and recommendations, since both organs rely on the approval
of the Conference such programs can easily come to naught in situa-
tions where purely nationalistic interests are allowed to override
those of the community.
III. THE 1965 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
In examining some of the institutional shortcomings of LAFTA,
we have now set the stage for an analysis of changes in the struc-
ture of the Association which, at least potentially, resulted from a
series of events in 1965, changes which may bring about a consider-
able strengthening of the Latin American community. In effect,
the LAFTA nations have attempted to upgrade the level of deci-
sion-making within the Association and to begin to isolate it from
nationalistic pressures in order to allow it to better serve the com-
munity and accelerate the process of over-all economic integration
of the area. Opinions may differ as to how far the proposed
changes, once fully put into force, will go toward accomplishing
this objective.
On January 6, 1965, Eduardo Frei, President of Chile, wrote a
letter to four leading Latin American economists. 45 The letter ex-
4 4 Art. 42.
45 Letter from Eduardo Frei to Messrs. Ra6l Prebisch, Jos6 Antonio Mayobre, Felipe
Herrera, and Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria, January 6, 1965, in J. MAYOBRE, R. PRE-
[Vol. 2: 34
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF LAFTA
pressed concern with the lack of progress which had been made up
to that time toward the goal of economic integration:
[T]he advance towards economic integration has become slow and
cumbersome. The possibilites of making further headway under
the present system of minutely detailed tariff negotiations would
seem to be exhausted. This is not the way to promote substan-
tial inter-Latin American trade flows or to prepare ourselves for
the ineluctable task of competing on world markets. Does the
trouble lie in organic defects in the Montevideo Treaty, or in inef-
ficient use of its instruments?
The negotiations recently concluded in Bogoti show how awk-
ward it is to operate machinery that is not under control of a higher
authority, and, it would seem, simply follows the more or less
automatic procedures agreed upon years ago, thus betraying a want
of dynamic force.46
President Frei went on to request that the four economists pre-
sent a set of recommendations to the Latin American Presidents
which would point the way toward an acceleration of the process
of integration. The institutional machinery of the Montevideo
Treaty, he said, had "manifestly proved insufficient and inade-
quate. . . .such institutions should incorporate certain supranational
elements." 47
In response to President Frei's request, the four economists pub-
lished, on April 15, 1965, a statement of their unanimous opinions
as to the policies and institutions which ought to be adopted in order
to facilitate the economic integration of Latin America."
. In the institutional field, the four men made specific proposals
as to some of the entities which they felt were indispensable to the
achievement of complete integration. The touchstone of their pro-
posals is the need for supra-national institutions which would be
able to act in the interests of the community. "We must learn to
work together," they said, "we must form the community of Latin
BISCH, F. HERRERA & C. DE SANTA MARIA, HACIA LA INTEGRACION ACELERADA DE
AMERICA LATINA 1 (1965). An English translation of the letter and the report written
in response to it appear in S. DELL, supra note 1, at 279-310. [references to the letter
and report hereinafter cited to page in S. DELL). An English version of the report
only appears in 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 651-81 (1965).
46 S. DELL, supra note 45, at 280.
47Id., at 282.
4 8 J. MAYOBRE, ET AL, supra note 45, at 7; S. DELL, supra note 1, at 284; The four
men are eminently qualified to deal with Latin American problems; Mr. Herrera as the
President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Mr. Santa Maria as Chairman of
the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, Mr. Mayobre as Executive
Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
and Mr. Prebisch as Secretary-General of UNCTAD. S. DELL, supra at 284, n. 1.
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American peoples."4  The proposed institutional structure would
consist of a Council of Ministers, an Executive Board, the Latin
American Parliament, an Instrument for the Promotion of Regional
Investment, and a Conciliation Procedure. 50  The analogy to the
EEC Council, Commission, Assembly, and Court of Justice is un-
mistakable.51
President Frei's initiative in asking for the recommendations
of such widely respected Latin American public figures came at a
particularly auspicious time, for at the fourth regular session of the
Conference, Resolution 112 (IV) had been passed, calling for a
meeting during 1965 of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the
LAFTA nations.52 It was felt that a meeting on a high level was
necessary in order to deal with a "growing log-jam of undecided is-
sues and paralysis of action within LAFTA."53
The meeting of the Ministers took place in early November,
1965, in Montevideo. As part of the Final Act of the meeting,
several important resolutions were promulgated.54 Resolution I re-
solved to create the Council of Ministers as an organ of the Associ-
ation.5 Under this resolution, the Standing Executive Committee
was given the task of drafting the requisite instrument which would
formally institute the Council. As a provisional measure it was re-
solved that the Council should meet at least once a year within the
existing Conference of the contracting Parties.5 Thus it appears
that the report of the four economists had a considerable effect in
bringing about a resolve to change the structure of the Association.
Resolution 4 assigns to the Committee the drafting of an instru-
ment which would establish a mechanism for the settling of dis-
49 S. DELL, supra note 1, at 285.
50ld., at 306-308.
51Id., at 200-203.
52Id., at 205.
53 Id., at 199; DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 750.
54 The Final Act of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of LAFTA
appears in full in English in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 124 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 5 INTERNATIONAL
MATERIALS).
5 ALALC/RM/I/Resolution I - Creation of the Council of Ministers, in 5
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS, supra note 54, at 126.
56 Id. paragraphs 2, 3. It was felt that the Council of Ministers should begin func-
tioning on at least a provisional basis, as it was possible that it would take some time
before the new system could be put into force. DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra
note 9, at 756. There have indeed been delays in the ratification of the Protocol,
signed in December, 1966, which establishes the Council. As of this writing, this Pro-
tocol has not yet been ratified by all the Parties.
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putes among the contracting Parties. 57  The resolution establishes
several guidelines for the eventual instrument, among which is a
directive that the Committee should take into account a system of
compulsory procedures and a system of sanctions to back up the de-
cisions of any tribunals for which the Committee might provide.58
The Committee was also directed to study the possibility of estab-
lishing some sort of provisional mechanism within the existing
framework of the Treaty.5 9
A further accomplishment of the meeting was Resolution 19
which directed the Conference, at its fifth annual meeting, to es-
tablish a Technical Commission.60 The resolution outlined in some
detail the structure and attributions the Commission Was to have.
The Conference, together with the Executive secretary, was to
choose four nationals of the Parties to integrate the Commission.
The technicians thus chosen were to act "without governmental re-
sponsibilities and exclusively in their technical capacity."'" The
idea behind the Commission was that it should be isolated from
political pressures and be free to "carry out studies, formulate pro-
posals, and present plans to accelerate the economic and social inte-
gration process of the contracting Parties."62  Thus, the Commis-
sion could devote its energies entirely to the technical and planning
aspects of integration from a "community" viewpoint. On the
other end of the institutional scale would be the Council of Minis-
ters, representing the national interests of the Parties, and with the
over-all responsibility for political decision-making. Theoretically,
at least, "the relations between the two organs should result in an
equilibrium of interests which does not exist today.'"'6 Whether
the desired equilibrium will ever be achieved under such a system
is open to conjecture. However, inasmuch as the ultimate power
of decision resides in the Council, which like the Conference, still
allows a veto by any one of the contracting Parties, the achievement
of optimum equilibrium seems doubtful. 4
57 ALALC/RM/I/Resolution 4 - Settlement of Disputes in 5 INTERNATIONAL
MATERIALS, supra note 54, at 127-28.
58 Id., paragraph 3.
59ld., paragraph 4.
60 ALALC/RM/I/Resolution 19 - Creation of a Technical Commission in 5
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 136.
61 Id., paragraph 1.
62 Id., paragraph 2. See also DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 753.
63 DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 751 [translation by this author].
64 The amended Article 38 of the Protocol which establishes the Council (to be dis-
cussed infra) continues, for both Council and Conference, the rule of the veto of the
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Resolution 20 appears to have been an attempt to strengthen
the Standing Committee and make it more efficient:
The Conference shall delegate a larger number of special func-
tions to the Committee, in such a way that the latter can act ef-
fectively as an extension of the Conference between meetings,
dealing with and issuing decisions on matters involving a decision
of the Contracting Parties. Liaison and co-ordination between the
organs of the Association and between the Contracting Parties in
all matters relating to the operation of the Treaty and other instru-
ments that constitute the legal structure of LAFTA shall be per-
formed by the Standing Executive Committee. 65
Finally, in a rather cautious step toward another of the recom-
mendations made by the four economists, that of the establishment
of a Latin American Parliament, the Meeting promulgated Resolu-
tion 2. In this resolution, the Ministers recommended "the estab-
lishment in the national Parliaments of standing groups or commis-
sions to study and consider LAFTA affairs."' 6 One of the ideas be-
hind this resolution was that it would eventually facilitate the work
of harmonizing national legislation in order to perfect the political
integration of Latin America. 7  Clearly, however, such a stage of
integration is still many years away from reality.
IV. PENDING CHANGES
As was directed at the Meeting of Ministers, the Committee
drafted a Protocol institutionalizing the Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Latin American Free Trade Association
which was presented at the joint meeting of the Council of Ministers
and the Conference of the contracting Parties in December of 1966.68
As mentioned above, the Protocol specifically amends Articles 33-39
of the Treaty and to date remains the only Protocol which effects
such an amendment, the other Protocols being only ancillary to the
original instrument.69 Contrary to what might be expected, the
Protocol makes very few changes in the structure of the Association,
original Article 38 which provided for voting rules in the Conference. The new Arti-
cle 38, however, does allow the Council to establish a different rule at any time.
6 5 ALALC/RM/I/Resolution 20 - Co-ordination of the Technical Work of the
Association, paragraph 1, in 5 INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS, supra note 54, at 136-37.
66 ALALC/RM/I/Resolution 2 -Closer relationship between the Parliaments of
the Contracting Parties, paragraph 1, in 5 INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS, supra note 54,
at 126-27.
6 7 DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 765.
.68 An English version of the Protocol appears in IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note
1, at 318.
6 9 DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 765.
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other than to superimpose the Council of Ministers as the "supreme
organ" and make some redistribution of functions among the hier-
archy of organs.70
Under the new Article 34, for instance, the "Council is the su-
preme organ of the Association and shall make the decisions con-
cerning the conduct of its higher policy."'" This language differs
somewhat from the parallel language in the original article, under
which the Conference, as supreme organ, was to "adopt all decisions
in matters requiring joint action on the part of the contracting Par-
ties." The new language seems to indicate, then, that the decisions
to be made by the Council are on a higher level than those which
could be made by the Conference, and indeed this was the reason for
creating the Council in the first place. It was felt that if a Council
could be composed of ministerial representatives it would somehow
be able to adopt more sweeping political decisions than could a
legislative body composed of lower echelon officials. Whether
such a premise will in fact prove valid is open to debate, especially
given the traditional notions of sovereignty which still persist in
Latin America.
The new Council is given a rather sweeping mandate. Among
its list of enumerated powers are the following:
(a) To enact general rules which will permit a better achievement
of the objectives of the Treaty and, especially, those which
will tend to accelerate harmoniously the process of develop-
ment and economic and social integration of the contracting
Parties;
70 The Protocol was the product of lengthy debate in the Committee and represents
a choice between two divergent positions. One of these, expounded chiefly by Chile,
would have effected a complete reorganization of the institutional structure of LAFTA.
Under this view, it was considered necessary to simplify the organizational hierarchy by
doing away with the Conference and transferring all of its legislative functions to the
Council of Ministers. The maintenance of two legislative bodies whose spheres of ac-
tion would be difficult to define was seen as impractical and sure to affect adversely pro-
gress within LAFTA.
On the other hand, Argentina and Mexico stood behind the idea of maintaining
the Conference as a viable part of the hierarchy. Their argument was that neither the
Council nor the Committee would be well enough equipped to look after the yearly
trade negotiations. Moreover, they said, the draft protocol on the settlement of disputes
attributed important duties in this regard to the Conference which could not easily be as-
sumed by either the Committee or the Council.
In the end the Committee presented 2 draft protocols, one representing each posi-
tion, to the meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Conference, which went on to
adopt its own solution although in that the Conference was retained, the final result
closely resembled the Argentina-Mexico project. DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra
note 9, at 758-63.
71 Protocol Institutionalizing the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
Latin American Free Trade Association (Signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, December 12,
1966), in IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 318-21.
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(b) To examine the results of the tasks accomplished by the As-
sociation and establish the fundamental features that may
serve as the basis for work programs of the other organs of
the Association. 72
Thus the new Article 34 contains a much more explicit direction
that the Council work toward the goal of integration. It will be
remembered that the original Article 34(a) merely empowered the
Conference to "take the necessary steps to carry out the present
Treaty and to study the results of its implementation," a far more
diffuse grant of powers than is contained in the new article."3
Other powers enumerated in the new article include primarily pro-
cedural directives such as resolving matters "it considers appropriate
from among those referred to it by the Conference or Committee,"
the fixing of "basic rules to govern the relations of the Association
with third countries, regional associations, and international organ-
izations or entities," and the changing of its own and the Confer-
ence's voting systems."4 The Council also is given specifically the
authority to amend the Treaty under Article 60."
The new Article 35 sets out the powers of the Conference,
some of which are:
(a) To promote the negotiations provided for in Article 4 and to
assess the results thereof;
(b) To undertake the tasks entrusted to it by the Council;
(c) To consider and resolve, within its competency, matters sub-
mitted to it by the Committee;
(d) To adopt, within its competency, measures necessary for carry-
ing out the Treaty and pertinent protocols; ...
(h) To deal with all matters of common interest that do not per-
tain to the conduct of the higher policy of the Association. 76
Now, indeed, it appears that what was initially stated regarding
the function of the Conference - that it merely supervised the Arti-
72 Id., art. 34, a, b, at 318-19.
73 There was considerable debate during the preparation of the draft protocol, con-
cerning the question of whether the grant of powers to the Council ought to be exten-
sive, a position favored by Chile, or explicitly limited, with powers enumerated exhaus-
tively, a course favored by Mexico. According to the latter position, the Council should
not be allowed to legislate in a manner which might transcend the boundaries of States
and affect individuals and organizations. Conceding that the Treaty seeks to foment a
higher form of integration than that of a free trade zone, Mexico argued that prepara-
tion and maturity did not exist in sufficient measure to support the creation of a supra-
national legislative body. DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 760.
74 Protocol Institutionalizing the Council of Ministers, supra note 71, Art. 34 (c),
(d), and (g), respectively. [the amended articles are contained within Article 1 of the
Protocol].
7
5Id. Art. 34 (f).
761d. Art. 35.
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cle 4 negotiations - has been codified. In fact, the only really
specific grant of powers, with the exception of several procedural
matters with which the Conference deals, is in paragraph (a). The
other grants of power are rather residual ones, i.e. it can deal only
with matters entrusted to it by the Council or Committee, and with
measures pertaining to the Treaty and protocols, that are within its
competency. What exactly that competency may be is hard to un-
derstand, unless possibly it refers back to the Article 4 negotiations
mentioned in paragraph (a). The result of such a construction
might be that the Conference would end up with nearly exclusive
control over the negotiations and matters ancillary to them, since
these decisions would tend to filter through the other organs into
the Conference. Section (a) itself, however, says that the Confer-
ence is to "promote" the negotiations. Taken literally, this could
mean that it is restricted to preparatory work, or some sort of "pump
priming" function. If this be true, then it hardly seems necessary,
or even justifiable, for the Conference to continue in existence.
In fact, one of the arguments advanced in favor of maintaining
the Conference was that it had become "traditional" within the As-
sociation.7" This and other arguments would seem to be outweighed
by a more logical one which asserts that the Conference should be
abolished altogether. Under this line of reasoning, it makes very
little sense to have two organs within the Association.- the Coun-
cil and the Commission - both of inter-governmental character,
representing the same basic interests, and exercising similar func-
tions.78 The result is to disturb the "equilibrium of interests" (in-
tergovernmental vs. community) mentioned above, which was one
of the principal reasons for creating the Council of Ministers in
the first place.
In short, then, the continued existence of the Conference, given
the extreme difficulty of delimiting its functions, or even of attri-
buting any really meaningful functions to it under the proposed
structure, is somewhat of an anomaly in what is supposed to be a
more efficacious institutional structure.
There remains, of course, the possibility that the Council will
never come into permanent existence. Under Article 3 of the Pro-
tocol itself, it does not come into force until 30 days after all of the
contracting Parties have deposited instruments of ratification in the
77 DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 7 60-62.
781d. at 762.
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Secretariat of the Committee.79 More than 3 years have now passed
since the Protocol was signed and it still lacks ratification by all the
Parties. Whether this delay is only administrative, or whether it
portends some sort of substantive difficulty in the Protocol or the
institutions it establishes which has caused unforeseen problems in
national parliaments, is open to conjecture. It is clear that if the
contracting Parties fail to ratify the Protocol, it will represent a
grave setback for the Association, not only because this would neces-
sitate a retrenchment to the old structure, but also because such a
failure would surely indicate a lack of a long range commitment
on the part of the contracting Parties to the objectives of the Treaty,
the Association and the free trade area under its aegis, a lacuna
which might result in the demise of the entire scheme.
Another result of the 1965 meeting of Foreign Ministers was the
creation of a Technical Commission, as discussed above.8" While
perhaps the most important organ, at least potentially, in terms of
the implantation of "community" interests, the initiative has not
yet gone beyond the original resolution and a corresponding one
promulgated by the Conference.8' Although several attempts have
been made to nominate the members of the Commission and for-
mally establish it, all have failed.'
The lack of agreement about the Commission, however, seems
to portend a divergence of viewpoints even more fundamental. One
position, advocated chiefly by Chile, favors authorizing the Commis-
sion to adopt decisions which would be binding upon the contract-
ing Parties, at least within its own sphere of competency. This
would give full play to the Commission as a "community" organ
in true equilibrium with the intergovernmental organs of the As-
sociation.8" The opposite camp in the dispute holds that "to confer
such supra-national powers upon the Commission would be to intro-
duce an element which is incompatible with the present-day situation
of LAFTA," and argues further that "these political and supra-na-
79 Protocol Institutionalizing the Council of Ministers, supra note 71, Article 3.
80Supra notes 57-59 and related text.
81 Resolution 118(V) - Organization of the Technical Committee [this resolution
appears in IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 321-22. The use of the word "Com-
mittee" in its title may be an error in translation, as the resolution of the Meeting of
Foreign Ministers referred to a "Commission"].
82 According to one source, upon the first attempt to form the Commission, which
took place at the fifth regular session of the Conference in December, 1965, the nomi-
nation of members degenerated to a point where it resembled "negotiations of a prod-
uct," drawing a protest from one of the contracting Parties which stifled further dis-
cussion. DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 753.
83 DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 755.
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tional functions would import in an advance not only toward eco-
nomic integration but toward political integration as well, all of
which would require greater clarification, and national political de-
cisions, as well as a prior and profound revision of the legal structure
of LAFTA."84 Thus, the fate of the proposed community organ of
LAFTA rests with the individual governments, most of which, for
the present at least, are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty
to the extent necessary for the establishment of a truly viable Com-
mission.
Finally, pursuant to Resolution 4 of the Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters, the Standing Executive Committee, as well as a meeting of
jurists held during May of 1966, drafted a number of proposals for
the establishment of a mechanism within the Association for the
settlement of disputes.85 A draft Protocol was then signed by the
Council of Ministers at its third special session in December, 1966.86
Article 1 of the proposed draft provides in part that:
The contracting Parties shall submit . . . all disputes that may
arise between them and which refer exclusively and directly to
specific and concrete cases relating to the Montevideo Treaty, its
Protocols, Resolutions, and Decisions rendered by organs of the
Latin American Free Trade Association and any other instruments
which constitute its legal structure. (emphasis supplied),87
The broad list of instruments which might be the source of dis-
pute thus sets up the kinds of cases which the Parties are obliged to
submit to the procedures established in the Protocol. This list also
constitutes the principal source of "law" which any tribunal consti-
tuted under the Protocol must apply under Article 27; the tribunal
is referred, subsidiarily, to Article 38, section 1 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. 88
84 Id. at 755 [translation by this author).
8 5 DERECHO DO INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 767.
86 Draft Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes, Resolution 172, in IIILS INSTRU-
MENTS, supra note 1, at 327-333.
87 Id. Article 1.
88 Id. Article 27. Article 38, section 1 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, provides that the court shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, [which provides that a decision of
the Court has no binding force except as between the parties of the par-
ticular case) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law.
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The principal feature of the system established by the Protocol
is that it sets up a series of 3 progressive stages which the Parties
must follow in attempting to sort out their differences. The Par-
ties in dispute are first directed to seek a settlement by direct nego-
tiation (Article 3). As a next step, having failed to reach agree-
ment in the first stage, any of the Parties may request a conciliation
procedure within the Executive Committee (Article 5). As a pre-
liminary question, the Committee must first decide whether the
dispute falls within the types of questions referred to in Article 1
(Article 6). If this determination is affirmative, then the Execu-
tive Committee is authorized to attempt a conciliation of the Par-
ties, but it may not render a decision as to the merits of the dispute
(Articles 7, 8).
The final step in the settlement process is arbitration of a dis-
pute by an ad hoc tribunal. According to Article 10 of the draft
Protocol, the parties to a dispute enter the final stage of proceedings
with what is in effect a clean record. That Article specifies that
"none of the Parties in dispute may make use of, in the arbitration
procedure provided for in this Protocol, the statements, admissions
of facts, or offers of agreement submitted by another Party during
the stages covered by Chapter II" (the negotiation and conciliation
stages]. By providing that nothing the parties have said or done
during the initial stages of the procedure can be used against them,
the framers of Protocol may have been trying to accomplish
two things: 1) increase the efficacy of the Chapter II proceedings
by obviating the necessity for the parties to proceed cautiously for
fear of compromising their position at a later stage, and 2) placate
the opposition to the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the
tribunal by avoiding any cumulative effect from stage to stage, thus
making of the tribunal a truly ad hoc judicial entity.
Article 16 of the draft proposal provides for recognition by the
Parties of the compulsory jurisdiction of the tribunal over a list of
specified matters to be formulated and annually revised by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. The recognition of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over the list of questions would be self-executing upon ratification
of the Protocol, since by the terms of Article 16, "the contracting
Parties acknowledge as compulsory and without need of special
agreement the jurisdiction of the tribunal." In a general way, how-
ever, the Parties would still have some sort of control over the juris-
diction of the tribunal, because they, through the Council of Minis-
ters, control the list of matters subject to that jurisdiction. It follows
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that the tribunal is not a truly autonomous judicial body within
the Association. Article 16 does provide, however, that the "list"
shall be reviewed annually by the Council "for the purpose of add-
ing new subjects." Literally construed, this must mean that once
such subjects are put on the compulsory jurisdiction list they may
not subsequently be removed. In other words, the Council may al-
ways expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but may not diminish it.
Resolution 198 of the Council approved the first list of subjects
under Article 16. These range from a series of questions about par-
ticular articles of the Montevideo Treaty to questions concerning Res-
olutions of the Conference, decisions of the Standing Executive
Committee, complementarity agreements under Chapter III of the
Treaty, and other questions totaling fifteen main headings in all.89
Article 17 provides for more sweeping acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction, on a voluntary basis, by any of the contracting Parties,
which for their part declare as individual nations that they accept
ipso facto the compulsory jurisdiction of the tribunal, "in respect of
any contracting Party that accepts the same obligation," over any
disputes within the terms of Article 1 of the Protocol.
The Protocol does not establish a standing judiciary. Rather,
each of the contracting Parties, under Article 12, nominates one
person able to "meet the requirements for holding high judicial of-
fice in their countries," as well as a second person of like qualifica-
tions to serve as an alternate. These persons are to be appointed for
renewable terms of eight years.9 The men so appointed constitute a
"pool" from which the ad hoc tribunals are drawn. Article 18 sets
forth several procedures for the constituting of a tribunal. Under
paragraph (a) of that article, the Parties themselves, by mutual
agreement, may select 3 arbitrators of their own choosing. Failing
such a selection by the Parties, a more or less automatic procedure
comes into play which will result in a tribunal of 3 men over-all.
The draft Protocol establishes a number of other regulations for
the system of dispute settlement. Among these are provisions that
the tribunal must decide all questions by majority vote (Article 28),
that decisions must be stated in writing together with the reasons
therefor (Article 29), that decisions are binding from the date of
notification of the parties (Article 30), that any party may request
an interpretation of a decision by the tribunal (Article 32), and
that any party may request a review of a decision within up to 2
89 DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 770.
90 Draft Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes, supra note 86, articles 13 & 14.
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years upon discovery of a decisive fact which could not reasonably
have been brought before the tribunal (Article 33). Under Arti-
cle 35, the parties in dispute share equally in the expenses of the
tribunal functioning in respect of the particular case.
The mechanism set up in the draft Protocol is a relatively mod-
est one, both in terms of conception as a purely arbitral entity, in-
stead of a truly judicial one, and because of the lack of compulsory
jurisdiction on a broad enough range of subjects. In spite of this,
however, there has been some rather intransigent position-taking in
debates about the institution, a fact which doubtless explains the
failure of the contracting Parties to ratify the Protocol." In the
meantime, a provisional mechanism is functioning on a much simpli-
fied basis, within the Standing Committee. 2  Basically, the proce-
dure resembles that of Chapter II within the draft proposal [negotia-
tion and conciliation phases], supplemented by a decision being
taken within the Committee itself, possibly with the assistance, on
specified questions, of a special Commission of Jurists, to be called
by the Committee.93
As has been mentioned, the proposed mechanism for the settle-
ment of disputes does not create a truly independent judicial body.
Because of this, it may not be as strong an institution as will be re-
quired once the process of integration is more fully under way.
Nonetheless, even such a cautious step toward the establishment of
a community institution has yet to be taken by the LAFTA govern-
ments. Lacking this essential key to the sorting out of relationships
which undoubtedly will be strained by continuing integration, it is
difficult to see how or even when LAFTA will achieve the goals it
has set for itself.
V. A FINAL APPRAISAL
After nearly a decade in existence, it is not too soon to wonder
whether LAFTA has made any real progress toward establishing a
strong institutional framework within and through which it can
consolidate the energies of its individual member nations for the in-
eluctable task of complete integration. As has been indicated, the
member nations of LAFTA have shown themselves reluctant to
take even modest steps toward the establishment of the supra-na-
9 1 See DERECHO DE INTEGRACION, supra note 9, at 769-76.
92 Establishment of a Provisional Machinery for Settlement of Disputes Between
the Contracting Parties of the Montevideo Treaty, Resolution 165(CM-I/III-E) in
IIILS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 333-335.
9 Id. paragraphs 4-6.
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tional organs which are unquestionably necessary for the integration
effort. At the same time, it must be remembered that for many of
these nations, meaningful working relationships with each other only
began with the signing of the Montevideo Treaty. Thus, it is not
particularly surprising that, by our standards at least, progress has
been slow.
That there has been progress is, nevertheless, unquestionable.
The institutions created at the 1965 Meeting of Foreign Ministers
displayed significant advances over those established by the Monte-
video Treaty. The new Council of Ministers, for instance, integrated
by high level political representatives of the Parties, even in its pro-
visional form has been able to make more significant progress to-
ward integration than had the old Conference. The continued
existence of the latter organ, on the other hand, is an anomalous
"holdover" from the original structure, but one which may eventually
disappear through a natural process.
The Technical Commission and the machinery for the settle-
ment of disputes are two other promising initiatives which, it is
submitted, await only a more favorable political climate for their
eventual ratification and establishment as working components of
the system.
It is apparent that the nations of Latin America now realize that
integration is the indispensable key to their continued social and
economic survival. It is also clear that they are intent upon forging
a system which is uniquely theirs and one which will serve their
particular needs. Such a system can hardly be established within
ten years. There has, however, been a solid and viable beginning.
WDB
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